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Abstract
According to Werner Sombarts classic text Luxury and Capitalism, the status-
seeking behavior of individuals may facilitate the development of capitalism and an
early industrialization. In this study, we develop a growth-theoretic framework to
formalize this hypothesis by introducing a status-seeking preference into the Schum-
peterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤. Then, we explore how this cultural
preference a¤ects the transition of an economy from pre-industrial stagnation to mod-
ern economic growth. We nd that the e¤ects of status-seeking behaviors evolve across
di¤erent stages of economic development. Specically, a stronger preference for status
seeking causes an earlier takeo¤ and increases economic growth in the short run but
has an overall negative e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate. Finally, we
calibrate the model to US data to perform a quantitative analysis and also use cross-
country data to estimate the e¤ects of status-seeking preference on economic growth.
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A new emphasis on the deployment of expensive, often durable manufac-
tured objectssilks, mirrors, elegant furniture, etc.replaced earlier ways of
expressing status, such as maintaining large retinues, which did less to stimulate
production. Pomeranz (2001, p. 107)
The bourgeois who lived in a hierarchical society had to prove himself and his
self-worth [...] and thus necessitated a new, heightened degree of luxury. This
further increased the demand for luxury, which according to Sombart specically
resulted in the creation of new markets that expanded the economy: as the desire
for luxury grew immensely, so did the markets to accommodate it. Franchetti
(2013, p. 135-136)
1 Introduction
According to Sombart (1967), the status-seeking behavior of individuals may facilitate the
development of capitalism and give rise to an early industrialization. In this study, we
provide a growth-theoretic framework to formalize this hypothesis. Specically, we introduce
a status-seeking preference into the Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤ in
Peretto (2015). Then, we use the model to explore how this cultural preference a¤ects the
transition of an economy from pre-industrial stagnation to modern economic growth. In
summary, we nd that the e¤ects of status-seeking behaviors evolve across di¤erent stages
of economic development. Specically, a stronger preference for status seeking leads to an
earlier takeo¤ and a higher rate of economic growth in the short run but has an overall
negative e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. The preference for status
seeking encourages the accumulation of assets and mitigates the preference for discounting,
which in turn reduces the equilibrium interest rate. This interest-rate e¤ect from the status-
seeking preference serves to stimulate the entry of rms with new products and the quality
improvement of products. Therefore, the market size (which is increasing in the population
size)1 required for innovation to occur becomes smaller. As a result, a stronger preference
for status seeking causes an economy to experience an earlier transition to growth with the
development of new products as hypothesized by Sombart (1967). However, the increased
entry of rms eventually reduces the market size of each rm. Given that the equilibrium
rate of innovation also depends positively on the rm size,2 the overall e¤ect of status seeking
on economic growth eventually becomes negative in the long run. We calibrate the model
to US data to perform a quantitative analysis and also use cross-country data to estimate
the e¤ects of status-seeking preference on economic growth. In summary, we nd supportive
empirical evidence for the theoretical implications of status seeking on economic growth.
This study relates to the literature on economic growth and innovation. Romer (1990)
develops the seminal R&D-based growth model in which the invention of new products drives
innovation. Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian growth model in which
1Kremer (1993) provides evidence for a positive relationship between the population size and technological
progress in early historical eras.
2See Cohen and Klepper (1996a, b) for evidence.
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the quality improvement of products drives innovation.3 A small number of studies in this
literature explore how the behavioral aspects of peoples preferences a¤ect innovation and
economic growth; see for example, Chu (2007) on entrepreneurial overcondence, Furukawa
et al. (2018, 2019) on the love of novelty, and Pan et al. (2018) and Hof and Prettner (2019)
on status-seeking preferences. We contribute to this literature by introducing a status-seeking
preference into the second-generation Schumpeterian growth model,4 whose implications are
supported by empirical evidence,5 to explore its di¤erent implications on economic growth
at di¤erent time horizons, which complement the interesting studies by Pan et al. (2018)
and Hof and Prettner (2019) who consider status-seeking households in the Romer model
and focus on economic growth in the long run.
There is also an established literature on status seeking and economic growth in capital-
based growth models; see Kurz (1968), Zou (1994, 1995), Corneo and Jeanne (1997) and
Futagami and Shibata (1998) for early studies and Pan et al. (2018) for a discussion of sub-
sequent studies in this literature. This literature is motivated by the insight of Max Weber.
According to Weber (1958), the desire to accumulate wealth stimulates the accumulation
of capital, which is the engine of economic growth in capital-based growth models. This
study is motivated by a related hypothesis in Sombart (1967), according to which the desire
for luxury consumption stimulates the development of new products and better products,
which are the engines of economic growth in the Schumpeterian growth model. Therefore, we
use the Schumpeterian growth model to consider status preference and formalize Sombarts
insight.
This study also relates to the literature on economic growth and endogenous takeo¤.
In this literature, seminal studies by Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002)
develop unied growth theory.6 Unied growth theory explores the endogenous transition
of an economy from stagnation to growth through a quality-quantity tradeo¤ in childrear-
ing and human-capital accumulation.7 In this literature, Galor and Michalopoulos (2012)
explore the evolutionary advantage of entrepreneurial spirit at di¤erent stages of economic
development. Although the transition from high fertility and low human capital investment
to low fertility and high human capital investment emphasized in unied growth theory is
certainly crucial for endogenous takeo¤, this study considers a complementary mechanism
through the acceleration of technological progress driven by the development of new prod-
ucts and the quality improvement of products, which relate most closely to Sombarts idea
on how luxury consumption a¤ects the development of capitalism. To formalize this idea,
we introduce a status-seeking preference into the Schumpeterian growth model with endoge-
nous takeo¤ developed by Peretto (2015) and explore how this cultural preference a¤ects the
endogenous transition of an economy from the pre-industrial era to modern industrial eras
through technological progress. Therefore, this study also contributes to a small but growing
literature on endogenous takeo¤ in the Schumpeterian growth model. For example, Iacopetta
3See also Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for other early studies.
4Peretto (1994, 1998, 1999), Smulders and van de Klundert (1995), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998),
Young (1998) and Howitt (1999) combine the two dimensions of innovation and develop the second-generation
Schumpeterian growth model, which is free from the counterfactual scale e¤ect in the Romer model.
5See Laincz and Peretto (2006), Ha and Howitt (2007), Madsen (2008, 2010) and Ang and Madsen (2011).
6See also Jones (2001) and Hansen and Prescott (2002) for other early studies on endogenous takeo¤.
7See also Galor and Mountford (2008), Galor et al. (2009), Ashraf and Galor (2011) and Galor (2011).
3
and Peretto (2020) explore how corporate governance a¤ects the endogenous transition of
an economy from pre-industrial stagnation to modern economic growth, whereas Chu et al.
(2020) explore the e¤ects of patent protection on endogenous takeo¤ in the Schumpeterian
growth model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
presents our theoretical, empirical and quantitative results. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian model with status-seeking culture
The Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤ is based on Peretto (2015). We
consider two types of agents in the Peretto model: workers and asset owners. Furthermore,
we introduce a status-seeking preference into the Peretto model.8 Specically, we assume
that asset owners have a status-seeking preference to aunt their wealth as hypothesized by
Sombart (1967).9
2.1 Population
The population size in the economy at time t is Lt, which grows at an exogenous rate  > 0.
An exogenous share s 2 (0; 1) of the population is workers, and they simply consume their
wage income wt. The remaining share 1   s of the population is asset owners, and they
accumulate assets for consumption and status seeking.
2.2 Status-seeking households
There is a unit continuum of households, which are indexed by h 2 [0; 1]. They have identical
homothetic preferences over consumption. Household hs utility function is given by10
U(h) =
Z
1
0
e ( )tut(h)dt =
Z
1
0
e ( )t
(
ln ct(h) + 
[at(h)=at]
1 1="   1
1  1="
)
dt, (1)
where ct(h) is household hs per capita consumption of the nal good (numeraire) and
the parameter  >  is the subjective discount rate. The parameter  > 0 captures the
households status-seeking preference in its wealth relative to other households, and the
parameter " > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The asset-accumulation
equation is given by
_at(h) = (rt   )at(h)  ct(h), (2)
8See He¤etz and Frank (2011) for a survey of experimental and empirical evidence on preferences for
social status.
9It is useful to note that although Sombarts idea is based on luxury consumption, some of these con-
sumption items (e.g., luxurious houses) are assets with resale value.
10All our results are robust to a more general utility specication ut(h) = ln ct(h) + v[at(h)=at], where
v(:) is a di¤erentiable and increasing function with v0(1) being a constant.
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where at(h) is the real value of assets owned by each member of household h.
We perform dynamic optimization and obtain the growth path of consumption ct(h) as
_ct(h)
ct(h)
= rt   + 
ct(h)
at

at(h)
at

 1="
.
Although the households are heterogeneous ex ante, they are homogeneous ex post such that
ct(h) = ct and at(h) = at for all h 2 [0; 1].
11 In this case, the growth path of consumption ct
simplies to
_ct
ct
= rt   + 
ct
at
, (3)
where the term ct=at captures the e¤ect of the status-seeking behavior of households.
2.3 Final good
The production function of the nal good is given by12
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)

Zt (i)Z
1 
t Ly;t=N
1 
t
1 
di, (4)
where f; ; g 2 (0; 1). Nt is the number of di¤erentiated intermediate goods. Ly;t denotes
production workers and is given by Ly;t = sLt in equilibrium. Xt (i) is the quantity of non-
durable intermediate good i 2 [0; Nt]. The productivity of Xt (i) depends on its own quality
Zt (i) as well as the average quality of all intermediate goods Zt 
R Nt
0
Zt (j) dj=Nt, which
captures technology spillovers. The parameter  determines the private return to quality,
and hence, 1  determines the degree of technology spillovers. The parameter  determines
a congestion e¤ect 1   of variety. As we will show, the social return to variety is .
Prot maximization yields the conditional demand functions for Ly;t and Xt (i) as
wt = (1  )
Yt
Ly;t
, (5)
Xt (i) =


Pt (i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t Ly;t
N1 t
, (6)
where Pt (i) is the price of Xt (i). Perfect competition implies that nal-good rms pay
(1  )Yt = wtLy;t for workers and Yt =
R Nt
0
Pt (i)Xt (i) di for intermediate goods.
11This assumption can be rationalized by an equal initial wealth a0(h) = a0 such that at(h) = at for all t.
See Chu and Peretto (2019) for an analysis of heterogeneous households in the Peretto model.
12A more familiar special case of the production function is Yt =
R Nt
0
Xt (i) [Zt (i)Ly;t]
1 
di, which
however does not capture technology spillovers 1    and the congestion e¤ect 1    of variety. The latter
feature serves to remove the scale e¤ect for all  < 1; see Peretto (2018) for a discussion on the robustness
of scale invariance in the second-generation Schumpeterian growth model.
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2.4 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
The intermediate-good sector is characterized by monopolistic competition. There is a con-
tinuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt]. A monopolistic rm produces di¤er-
entiated intermediate good i with a linear technology that requires Xt (i) units of the nal
good to produce Xt (i) units of intermediate good i. In other words, the marginal cost for the
monopolistic rm in industry i to produce Xt (i) with quality Zt (i) is one. The monopolistic
rm also needs to incur Zt (i)Z
1 
t units of the nal good as a xed operating cost. To
improve the quality of its products, the rm devotes It (i) units of the nal good to in-house
R&D. The process of in-house R&D is specied as
_Zt (i) = It (i) . (7)
The rms (before-R&D) prot ow at time t is
t (i) = [Pt (i)  1]Xt (i)  Z

t (i)Z
1 
t . (8)
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt (i) =
Z
1
t
exp

 
Z s
t
rudu

[s (i)  Is (i)] ds. (9)
The monopolistic rm maximizes (9) subject to (7) and (8). We solve this dynamic
optimization problem below and nd that the familiar prot-maximizing price is
Pt(i) = 1=. (10)
Following the standard approach in the literature, we consider a symmetric equilibrium in
which Zt (i) = Zt for i 2 [0; Nt] and the size of each intermediate-good rm is identical across
all industries Xt (i) = Xt.
13 From (6) and (10), the quality-adjusted rm size is
Xt
Zt
= 2=(1 )
Ly;t
N1 t
. (11)
We dene the following transformed variable:
xt  s
2=(1 ) Lt
N1 t
=
Xt
Zt
, (12)
which is a state variable whose dynamics depends on the ratio Lt=N
1 
t . Lemma 1 shows
that the rate of return on quality-improving R&D is increasing in the rm size xt.
14
Lemma 1 The rate of return on quality-improving in-house R&D is given by
rqt = 
t
Zt
= 

1  

xt   

. (13)
Proof. See Appendix A.
13Symmetry also implies t (i) = t, It (i) = It and Vt (i) = Vt.
14For a given Lt=N
1 
t , a larger s increases the rm size xt in (12) and the rate of return on innovation
in (13). As a result, a larger s also causes an earlier takeo¤ and a higher transitional growth rate but does
not a¤ect the steady-state growth rate due to the scale-invariant property of the model. Derivations are
available upon request.
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2.5 Entrants
To enter the market with a new variety of intermediate goods and set up its operation, a
new rm has to pay Xt units of the nal good, where  > 0 is an entry-cost parameter.
The value of a new rm at time t is Vt.
15 The asset-pricing equation can be written as
rt =
t   It
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (14)
When entry is positive, the entry condition is given by
Vt = Xt. (15)
Then, we can use (8), (10), (12), (14) and (15) to derive the rate of return on entry as
ret =
t   It
Zt
Zt
Xt
+
_Xt
Xt
=
1


1  

 
+ zt
xt

+ zt +
_xt
xt
, (16)
which also uses _Vt=Vt = _Xt=Xt = zt + _xt=xt, and zt  _Zt=Zt is the quality growth rate.
Equation (16) shows that the rate of return on entry is also increasing in the rm size xt.
2.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fat; Yt; Ct; Xt; Itg and prices frt; wt; Pt; Vtg such
that
 workers supply labor and consume their wage income wt;
 asset owners maximize utility taking rt as given;
 competitive nal-good rms produce Yt and maximize prots taking fwt; Ptg as given;
 intermediate-good rms choose fPt; Itg to maximize Vt taking rt as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking Vt as given;
 the value of all existing monopolistic rms adds up to the value of the households
assets such that NtVt = at(1  s)Lt;
 the labor market clears such that Ly;t = sLt; and
 the market-clearing condition of nal good holds:
Yt = Ct +Nt (Xt + Zt + It) + _NtXt,
where Ct = ct(1  s)Lt + wtsLt is the total consumption of asset owners and workers.
15To ensure symmetry, we assume that all new rms at time t have access to the aggregate technology Zt.
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2.7 Aggregate production function
Substituting (6) and (10) into (4) yields the aggregate production function given by
Yt = s
2=(1 )Nt ZtLt. (17)
The growth rate of per capita output yt  Yt=Lt is then
gt 
_yt
yt
= nt + zt. (18)
which depends on the variety growth rate nt  _Nt=Nt and the quality growth rate zt.
2.8 Dynamics of the consumption-wealth ratio
We can use (3) to rewrite (2) as
_ct
ct
 
_at
at
= (1 + )
ct
at
  + ,
which shows that the ct=at ratio always jumps to the following steady-state value:
ct
at
=
1
1 + 
(  ) . (19)
Substituting (19) into (3) yields the interest rate as
rt =
_ct
ct
+  

1 + 
(  ) , (20)
which shows that the preference for status seeking mitigates the preference for discounting
and reduces the equilibrium interest rate (for a given consumption growth rate of the house-
holds). As we will show, this interest-rate e¤ect from the status-seeking preference serves to
stimulate the entry of rms and quality-improving R&D but also reduces the steady-state
equilibrium rm size.
3 Status-seeking culture and endogenous takeo¤
As we will show below, the dynamics of the economy is determined by the dynamics of the
rm size xt, which is stable if the following condition holds:
16
 >
1


1  

  

  
1 + 
+

1  

>
1  

. (21)
16In our quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model to US data and nd that this condition holds under
reasonable parameter values.
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Given an initial value x0 > =(1  ),
17 the economy begins in a pre-industrial era in which
the growth rate of output per capita is zero. As the market size of rms becomes su¢ciently
large, the economy enters into the rst industrial era in which rms start to create new
products, whereas the growth rate becomes positive and gradually rises over time. Then, as
the market size of rms becomes even larger, the economy enters into the second industrial
era in which rms also start to improve the quality of products, and the growth rate continues
to increase. Eventually, the economy converges to the balanced growth path as the rm size
and the growth rate converge to the steady state. Figure 1 plots the HP-lter trend of
the per capita GDP growth rate in the US from 1801 to 2016 and shows that it is largely
consistent with the pattern described above.18 Specically, the growth rate in the US was
very low in the early 19th century, and then, it gradually increased (except for the wartime
periods) until reaching around 2% before the end of the 20th century.19
Figure 1: Economic growth in the US
In what follows, we show that a stronger preference for status seeking gives rise to an
earlier takeo¤ of the economy (i.e., from the pre-industrial era to the rst industrial era).
3.1 The pre-industrial era
In the pre-industrial era, the rm size xt is too small for innovation to be viable. Therefore,
the growth rate of output per capita is
gt = nt + zt = 0 (22)
because nt = zt = 0. In the pre-industrial era, the economy is in an equilibrium with
zero growth because the rm size xt is not large enough to provide su¢cient incentives for
17This condition implies 0 > 0.
18We use a smoothing parameter of 1000 to extract a smoother trend from the annual data.
19The growth rate has been falling since the beginning of the 21st century, partly due to the nancial
crises, such as the dot-com bubble and the Great Recession.
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innovation. However, the state variable xt = s
2=(1 )Lt=N
1 
0 increases according to
_xt
xt
= , (23)
and the rm size xt eventually becomes su¢ciently large to trigger the transition to growth.
3.2 The rst industrial era
Variety-expanding innovation becomes viable when the rm size xt reaches the threshold:
xN 

(1  )=   (  )=(1 + )
> x0, (24)
which is decreasing in the status-seeking parameter . Intuitively, a stronger status-seeking
preference reduces the equilibrium interest rate, which in turn increases the value of monop-
olistic rms and provides more incentives for the entry of rms; therefore, the market size
that is required for triggering entry becomes smaller.
Lemma 2 shows that the ct=yt ratio jumps to a steady-state value when the economy
enters the rst industrial era. This stationary property implies that ct and yt grow at the
same rate; i.e., _ct=ct = _yt=yt.
Lemma 2 Whenever nt > 0, the ct=yt ratio jumps to the steady state.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given Lemma 2, we can use (16) and (20) to derive the variety growth rate as20
nt =
1


1  

 

xt

 
  
1 + 
> 0, (25)
which is positive given xt > xN . Substituting (25) into _xt=xt =   (1  )nt yields
_xt =
1  


 

1  

  

  
1 + 
+

1  

xt

> 0. (26)
Finally, the equilibrium growth rate of output per capita is
gt = nt =



1  

 

xt

 
(  )
1 + 
> 0, (27)
which is increasing in the status-seeking parameter  (for a given rm size xt). Intuitively,
a stronger status-seeking preference reduces the equilibrium interest rate and provides more
incentives for the entry of rms. In summary, economic growth is driven by variety-expanding
innovation in the rst industrial era and gradually rises as the rm size xt increases.
20Here we also use zt = 0, r
e
t = rt = + gt   ct=at = + nt   ct=at and _xt=xt =   (1  )nt.
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3.3 The second industrial era
When the rm size xt reaches the second threshold xZ (to be derived below), quality-
improving innovation also becomes viable. In this case, the equilibrium growth rate of
output per capita is given by
gt = rt   +

1 + 
(  ) = 

1  

xt   

  +

1 + 
(  ) > 0, (28)
which uses rt = r
q
t in (13) and is increasing in the status-seeking parameter  (for a given
rm size xt). Intuitively, a stronger status-seeking preference reduces the equilibrium interest
rate and provides more incentives for in-house R&D. The equilibrium growth rate gt in (28)
continues to rise gradually as the rm size xt increases.
In the second industrial era, economic growth is driven by both quality-improving inno-
vation and variety-expanding innovation. Then, (18) and (28) imply that the quality growth
rate zt is given by
zt = gt   nt = 

1  

xt   

  +

1 + 
(  )  nt > 0, (29)
where the variety growth rate nt can be derived from (16) and (20) as
21
nt =
1


1  

 
+ zt
xt

 
  
1 + 
> 0. (30)
We can use (29) and (30) to solve for the variety growth rate nt and substitute it into
_xt=xt =   (1  )nt to derive the linearized dynamics of xt as
_xt =
1  


(1  ) 

  
1 + 
+

1  

 

(1  ) (1  )

  

  
1 + 
+

1  

xt

 0,
(31)
which uses the approximation =xt = 0 as in Peretto (2015). We can also use (29) and (30)
to solve for the quality growth rate zt as a function of xt. The following threshold for xt > xZ
ensures zt > 0:
xZ  arg
x
solve

1  

x  

 

x

=
(1  )(  )
1 + 
+ 

. (32)
The following parameter restriction ensures that xZ > xN :
22
 <
1


1  

 
  
1 + 
"
1 +

1 + 
  
2
 (1  )

#
. (33)
21Here we also use ret = rt = + gt   ct=at = + nt + zt   ct=at and _xt=xt =   (1  )nt.
22Derivations are available upon request.
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3.4 Balanced growth path
In the long run, the rm size xt converges to the steady state x
 given by
x(
 
) =
(1  ) 
 
 
1+
+ 
1 

(1  )(1  )=   
 
 
1+
+ 
1 
 > 0, (34)
which is decreasing in the status-seeking parameter  given (21) due to a higher rate of
entry of rms such that the size of each rm eventually becomes smaller. The steady-state
equilibrium growth rate is then
g = 

1  

x(
 
)  

  +

1 + 
(  ) > 0, (35)
which consists of both positive and negative e¤ects from the status-seeking parameter .
On the one hand, the status-seeking preference mitigates the preference for discounting
and reduces the equilibrium interest rate, which stimulates quality-improving R&D. On the
other hand, it also stimulates the entry of rms and decreases the equilibrium rm size,
which reduces economic growth. As we will show, the negative e¤ect dominates the positive
e¤ect rendering an overall negative e¤ect of  on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
3.5 Dynamics from stagnation to growth
Figure 2 summarizes the dynamics of the equilibrium growth rate from stagnation to growth
as follows.23 In the pre-industrial era, the growth rate of output per capita is zero. When
the economy enters the rst industrial era with variety-expanding innovation, the growth
rate of output per capita becomes positive. After that, the growth rate rises further as
the economy enters the second industrial era with both quality-improving innovation and
variety-expanding innovation. Eventually, the economy converges to the balanced growth
path with a steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
Figure 2: Dynamics of the growth rate
23In Figure 2, TN (TZ) is the time when variety-expanding (quality-improving) innovation is activated.
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Figure 3 shows that a stronger preference  for status seeking leads to an earlier takeo¤
of the economy because xN in (24) is decreasing in the status-seeking parameter , which
reduces the equilibrium interest rate and increases the value of monopolistic rms. For a
given xt, a stronger preference  for status seeking also increases the equilibrium growth
rate by reducing the interest rate and providing more incentives for the entry of rms and
quality-improving R&D; see (27) and (28). This positive e¤ect of status-seeking preference
on economic growth is consistent with Pan et al. (2018) and Hof and Prettner (2019).
However, we also nd that the steady-state equilibrium rm size is decreasing in  due to
the increased entry of rms. Overall, the e¤ect of status-seeking preference  on the steady-
state equilibrium growth rate is negative as shown in Figure 3. We summarize all these
results in Proposition 1.
Figure 3: Status seeking and economic growth
Proposition 1 A stronger preference for status seeking leads to an earlier takeo¤ and a
higher rate of economic growth (for a given rm size) in industrial eras; however, it also
reduces the steady-state rm size and the steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.6 Empirical analysis
In this section, we follow Pan et al. (2018) to construct a country-level proxy for status
preference based on the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS provides cross-country
information on peoples attitudes, beliefs and values across a range of topics. It covers a
time span of 30 years with ve waves, corresponding to the years 1981-1984, 1989-1993,
1994-1998, 1999-2004 and 2005-2009, respectively. Respondents in this survey were asked
questions that relate to the societys culture and individual preferences. Here we follow Pan
13
et al. (2018) to use the fraction of respondents who select thrift saving money and things as
an important quality as a proxy for the importance of status preference.24
Our theoretical model predicts that a stronger preference for status seeking generates a
positive e¤ect on economic growth in the short run and a negative e¤ect on economic growth
in the long run. Unfortunately, we do not have enough data to estimate the impulse response
function of economic growth in response to a shock to the status preference. Instead, we
explore an auxiliary implication of our theoretical model. Specically, a stronger preference
for status seeking generates a positive e¤ect on economic growth at an early stage of economic
development. As the country develops overtime, its e¤ect on economic growth eventually
becomes negative as Figure 3 shows.
Therefore, we use the following empirical specication to examine our theory:
git = 1it + 2it  yit + 3yit +  it + 't + it,
where git denotes the average annual growth rate of real GDP (or the average annual growth
rate of real GDP per capita) in country i at wave t, it denotes the average value of status
preference in country i at wave t, and yit is the log value of per capita GDP in country i in
the initial year of wave t. it is a vector of the average value of the following control variables
in each wave: the log value of population, the degree of openness,25 the ination rate, and
the government consumption share of GDP.26 't is the wave xed e¤ect, and it is the error
term. After merging data from the WVS and the Penn World Table, we have a sample of 165
observations covering 81 countries;27 see Table B1 in Appendix B for the summary statistics
of the variables. Our theory predicts that 1 > 0 and 2 < 0. In other words, a stronger
preference for status seeking generates a positive (negative) e¤ect on economic growth at an
early (later) stage of economic development.
Table 1 reports the baseline regression results. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2)
is the average annual growth rate of real GDP, whereas the dependent variable in columns
(3)-(4) is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Odd columns present
the baseline results without additional controls. In even columns, we further control for
additional explanatory variables. As expected, in all the columns, the coe¢cient on status
preference is signicantly positive, whereas the interaction term between status preference
and the income level is signicantly negative. Specically, in column (4), the estimated
coe¢cient on status preference is 0.270, which is statistically signicant at the 5% level,
whereas the estimated coe¢cient on the interaction term is -0.031, which is also statistically
signicant at the 5% level. These estimates imply that increasing the status preference value
by 0.1 is associated with an increase in the growth rate by 0.826% ((0.270-0.031*6.045)*0.1)
for a country with minimal GDP per capita and a decrease in the growth rate by 0.650%
((0.270-0.031*10.806)*0.1) for a country with maximal GDP per capita.28 Therefore, the
e¤ects of the status-seeking culture on economic growth are di¤erent for countries at di¤erent
levels of economic development.
24Similarly, Dorius and Baker (2012) also choose thrift saving money and things as one of the proxies for
capitalist value. The other proxy that they use is hard work.
25The degree of openness is measured by the average ratio of export plus import to GDP.
26Data source: Penn World Table 7.1.
27We cannot control for country xed e¤ects as some countries only have one wave of data in the WVS.
28Both of these e¤ects are statistically signicant at the 10% level.
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Table 1: E¤ects of status preference on economic growth
GDP growth per capita GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
it 0.281** 0.254** 0.282** 0.270**
(0.122) (0.123) (0.119) (0.119)
it  yit -0.034** -0.033** -0.032** -0.031**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
yit 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Control variables No Yes No Yes
Observations 165 165 165 165
R-squared 0.201 0.233 0.112 0.143
Note: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent
variable in columns (1)-(2) is the average annual growth rate of real GDP. The dependent variable in
columns (3)-(4) is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Compared with odd columns, even
columns add control variables including openness, the ination rate, (log) population, and the government
consumption share.
3.7 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to US data to perform a quantitative analysis. The
model features the following parameters: f; ; ; ; ; ; ; g.29 We set the discount rate 
to a conventional value of 0.05. We follow Iacopetta et al. (2019) to set the social return of
variety  to 0.25.30 The long-run population growth rate in the US is 1.8%.31 Furthermore,
we calibrate f; ; g by matching the following moments of the US economy: 60% for the
labor income share of GDP, 64% for the consumption share of GDP, and 2% for the long-run
growth rate of output per capita. Equation (35) shows that the strength of the negative e¤ect
of  on g is increasing in , which is the inverse of the degree of technology spillovers. Given
that the strength of the negative e¤ect (relative to the positive e¤ect) of status preference
 on long-run growth depends on , we consider a range of values for  2 [0:05; 0:50].32
Finally, we consider  = 0 as our benchmark and simulate the steady-state growth rate as 
increases.
Table 2: Calibrated parameter values
      
0.050 0.050 0.250 0.018 0.400 7.813 3.352
0.200 0.050 0.250 0.018 0.400 7.813 0.802
0.350 0.050 0.250 0.018 0.400 7.813 0.438
0.500 0.050 0.250 0.018 0.400 7.813 0.292
29It is useful to note that " does not a¤ect the equilibrium conditions.
30We also consider  = 0:40 as a robustness check and report the results in Appendix C.
31Data source: Maddison Project Database.
32According to Iacopetta et al. (2019), the empirically relevant range for  is from 0.17 to 0.33.
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Figure 4: Status seeking and long-run growth Figure 5: Simulated path of the growth rate
Figure 4 simulates the e¤ects of the status-seeking preference  on the steady-state equi-
librium growth rate g under di¤erent values of . As expected, for all values of , the
steady-state growth rate g is decreasing in . We see that as the value of  increases
(i.e., the degree of technology spillovers 1    decreases), the negative e¤ect of  becomes
stronger. We stop at the value of  = 0:50 because a larger value of  corresponds to a
smaller calibrated value of  in Table 2, and the inequality in (21) requires a su¢ciently
large . Iacopetta et al. (2019) nd that the empirically relevant range of values for  is
from 0.17 to 0.33. Therefore, we consider the set of parameter values that correspond to
 = 0:2. Figure 5 simulates and compares the dynamic paths of the equilibrium growth
rate from pre-industrial stagnation to modern economic growth for the following values of
 2 f0; 0:5g. The larger value of  reduces the long-run growth rate from 2% to 1.2% but
leads to an earlier takeo¤ by about 4 years. Finally, Figure 6 simulates the e¤ects of the
status-seeking preference  on how much earlier the takeo¤ would occur and shows that the
number of years is increasing in  but independent of .
Figure 6: Status seeking and takeo¤
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4 Conclusion
In this study, we have introduced a status-seeking preference into the Schumpeterian growth
model to explore how this cultural preference a¤ects the endogenous transition of an economy
from pre-industrial stagnation to modern economic growth. We nd that a stronger prefer-
ence for status seeking leads to an earlier takeo¤ by increasing the entry of rms with new
di¤erentiated products. This theoretical nding formalizes the hypothesis on status-seeking
luxury and capitalism proposed by Sombart (1967).
Furthermore, a stronger preference for status seeking causes a higher rate of economic
growth in the short run by increasing the entry of rms and quality-improving R&D. How-
ever, due to the increased entry of rms, the market size of each rm eventually becomes
smaller and causes also a negative e¤ect on economic growth. The overall e¤ect of a stronger
status-seeking preference on long-run economic growth is negative. These contrasting e¤ects
on economic growth at di¤erent time horizons highlight the importance of endogenous rm
size (which removes the scale e¤ect) for the analysis of status seeking and economic growth.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We use the Hamiltonian to solve the rms dynamic optimization.
The current-value Hamiltonian of rm i is given by
Ht (i) = t (i)  It (i) + t (i) _Zt (i) , (A1)
where t (i) is the costate variable on _Zt (i). We substitute (6)-(8) into (A1) and derive
@Ht (i)
@Pt (i)
=
@t (i)
@Pt (i)
= 0, (A2)
@Ht (i)
@It (i)
= 0) t (i) = 1, (A3)
@Ht (i)
@Zt (i)
= 
(
[Pt (i)  1]


Pt (i)
1=(1 )
sLt
N1 
  
)
Z1 t
Z1 t (i)
= rtt (i)  _t (i) , (A4)
where Zt (i) is a state variable. It can be shown that @t (i) =@Pt (i) = 0 yields Pt (i) = 1=.
Substituting (A3), (10) and (12) into (A4) and imposing symmetry yield (13).
Proof of Lemma 2. When the economy enters into the rst industrial era, variety-
expanding innovation is activated. Then, we can apply the entry condition Vt = Xt to
at =
VtNt
(1  s)Lt
=
XtNt
(1  s)Lt
=
2
1  s
yt, (A5)
which also uses Yt = PtXtNt = XtNt=. Di¤erentiating (A5) with respect to t yields
2
1  s
_yt = _at = (rt   )
2
1  s
yt   ct. (A6)
Then, we can use (3) and (A5) to rearrange (A6) as
_ct
ct
 
_yt
yt
= (1 + )
1  s
2
ct
yt
  + , (A7)
which shows that the ct=yt ratio jumps to its steady-state value when the economy enters
the rst industrial era.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, use (24) to show that xN is decreasing in . Second, use
(27) and (28) to show that gt is increasing in  for a given xt. Third, use (34) to show that
x is decreasing in . Finally, one can use (35) to show that33
sgn

@g
@

= sgn
(
(1  )
1  

  

2
   (1  )

 
1  


1  

)
, (A8)
where 
   
1+
+ 
1 
. Finally, the inequality in (21) implies that
(1  )
1  

  

2
< (1  )
1  


(1  )
1  

  


<  (1  )

 
1  


1  

,
which in turn implies @g=@ < 0 from (A8).
33Derivations are available upon request.
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Appendix B: Data
In this appendix, we present the summary statistics of the data for the empirical analysis.
Table B1: Summary statistics
variable obs mean std. dev. min max
Growth of real GDP 165 0.039 0.032 -0.088 0.171
Growth of real GDP per capita 165 0.027 0.030 -0.081 0.138
Status preference 165 0.350 0.146 0 0.673
Log real GDP per capita 165 8.884 1.114 6.045 10.806
Log population 165 10.170 1.604 6.522 14.086
Openness 165 0.689 0.427 0.143 3.724
Government consumption share 165 0.086 0.041 0.018 0.269
Ination rate 165 1.530 6.384 0.840 83.034
22
Appendix C: Robustness check
In this appendix, we present the calibration/simulation results for the case of  = 0:4.
Here we report the results for  2 [0:05; 0:45] under which the inequality in (21) holds. The
following gures show that the results here are qualitatively the same as our benchmark
results. Figure C2 reports the result for  = 0:2 as before.
Table C1: Calibrated parameter values
      
0.050 0.050 0.400 0.018 0.400 7.813 2.911
0.200 0.050 0.400 0.018 0.400 7.813 0.709
0.350 0.050 0.400 0.018 0.400 7.813 0.395
0.450 0.050 0.400 0.018 0.400 7.813 0.301
Figure C1: Status seeking and long-run growth Figure C2: Simulated path of the growth rate
Figure C3: Status seeking and takeo¤
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